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Religion and Geopolitics in Iranian Foreign Policy 
Dr Edward Wastnidge25
Saudi Arabia and Iran, as key power brokers in the Middle East, continue to couch their bilateral relations in 
antagonistic terms as they chafe against each other in a battle for influence in the region. Characterising this 
rivalry in the purely sectarian terms of a deep-rooted Sunni-Shi’a enmity is simplistic and fails to understand 
the complex geopolitical dynamics at play. However, for the Islamic Republic, Iran’s religious identity as the 
pre-eminent ‘Shi’a power’ gives it a means of influence and co-optation over its co-religionists. A key 
element of building such relationships is its transnational religious networks which form the basis of much of 
its cultural and religious diplomacy work. 
Religion, justice and contemporary Iranian foreign policy 
Iran’s commitment to the core revolutionary themes of ‘justice’, ‘resistance’, and the cultivation of Shi’a 
networks act as a continual thread in its foreign policy since the revolution. While high-level diplomacy 
relating to Iran is often cast in terms of its elected President and their own foreign policy outlooks,26 this only 
tells part of the story, with the religious networks and cultural outreach work fostered by the Islamic 
Republic abroad coming under the purview of the Supreme Leader.
Iran’s ability to make use of its transnational links to Shi’a communities has been aided by regional 
developments, most notably the ouster of Saddam Hussein and coming to power of a friendly government in 
Iraq. Iran’s position as the Shi’a metropole gives it the ability to make use of its transnational religious 
networks as and when they serve its national interests. This has long been the case in its sponsorship of 
Hizballah, and also in the religious justification seen in taking the fight to Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Iran sees 
itself and by extension Shi’a communities it has ties with, as a victim of sectarianism in the region. The 
Islamic Republic has tied this fight to its long-standing resistance narrative, and thus carrying out its own 
‘war on terror’ in the face of the Sunni ‘takfiri’ threat.27 Resistance to Israeli and Western aims in the region, 
support for the Palestinian cause, and protection of the Shi’a draw on ideas of ‘justice’ and which form part 
of the Islamic Republic’s constitutionally-defined foreign policy objectives,28 which seek to give support to 
the oppressed.
Religious networks
Having abandoned the active export of the Islamic revolution in the 1980s, Iran went on to invest in building 
its diplomatic and religious infrastructure, expanding its religious outreach activities across the Shi’a world, 
drawing on its position as something of a Shi’a metropole in a demonstration of its growing soft power. This, 
in combination with the repression of Iraqi Shi’a until the removal of Saddam Hussein, meant that Iranian 
centres of religious learning, most notably Qom, came to rival and in some cases overtake the traditional 
Shi’a centre of Najaf in Iraq, though the balance has been redressed somewhat in recent years.29 Iran’s 
transnational religious linkages help to provide legitimacy for Iran’s actions in terms of its activities in the 
region. This can be seen in its application of a religious overlay in its active military engagements in Iraq and 
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I.B. Tauris. 
27 Edward Wastnidge,‘Iran’s own ‘War on Terror’: Iranian foreign policy towards Syria and Iraq during the Rouhani Era, in Luciano Zaccara (ed) The 
Foreign Policy of Iran under President Hassan Rouhani (Palgrave MacMillan, forthcoming 2019). 
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Syria, such as through the channelling of ‘shrine defenders’ to conflict zones from Shi’a communities in the 
region.30 This gives Iran a significant role among Shi’a communities that it can utilise to enhance its standing 
among its co-religionists.31
Iran has historical ties to Iraqi Shi’a which go back to long-standing religious and familial ties with shrine 
cities in southern Iraq, most notably Najaf and Karbala. The latter, being the site of the martyrdom of the 
third Shi’a imam, Hussein, carries great significance to Shi’a worldwide and symbolises the fight against 
oppression and unjust rulers which has proved so foundational to the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary 
message. These ties were also strengthened through political sanctuary provided by the Islamic Republic to 
Shi’a opposition fleeing Saddam. Similarly, the religious links with Lebanese Shi’a are well-documented and 
go back centuries, as do religious ties to the Shi’a populations in Bahrain, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.32
The centrality of Iran in the Shi’a world can be seen in the cosmopolitan nature of Qom - the centre of 
Iranian religious learning. Here students and clerics from across the world attend its various seminaries, and 
then go back to their own countries having earned their religious education in Iran, further cementing ties.
However, this transnational network not only comprises traditional ‘religious’ activities affiliated to the 
hawza but also involves the educational and diplomatic missions undertaken abroad by the Iranian 
government. The transnational linkages that Iran has as a result of its position as religious hub are used as 
vector to enhance diplomatic relations and deepen ties with communities across the Shi’a world, acting as 
an enhancer of its soft power.33 This work is carried out through various parastatal organisations, such as the 
Ahl ul-Bayt World Assembly, Islamic Culture and Relations Organisation (ICRO) and the Imam Khomeini Relief 
Foundation (Emdad). The Ahl ul-Bayt grouping brings Shi’a scholars and religious leaders from around the 
world together every four years for a conference in Tehran.34 The ICRO direct Iran’s cultural diplomacy and 
employ its cultural attaches abroad – they have a flexible remit in terms of their cultural outreach,35 though 
much of its work is done in the religious sphere.  Emdad,36 as one of Iran’s largest charitable foundations, 
carries out development work primarily inside Iran, but also has an active international operation providing 
development assistance to Muslim communities worldwide. 
Iran thus has a multiplicity of networks which draw on its position as a centre of Shi’a learning and influence, 
and which allow it to harness an identity-based narrative that finds a practical utility in both its soft and 
‘hard’ engagements in the region. Its position as a Shi’a metropole gives it a means of influence among Shi’a 
worldwide, with its cultural and religious outreach work further reinforcing ties to these communities.
30 Wastnidge, Iran’s own ‘War on Terror’
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